International Dimensions

Past assessments have covered international dimensions of climate change impacts and adaptation for Canada. From Impacts to Adaptation: Canada in a Changing Climate (Lemmen et al., 2008) included a chapter on Canada in an international context. This assessment concluded that climate change impacts elsewhere in the world and adaptation measures to address them could affect Canadians, the competitiveness of some Canadian industries, as well as international assistance, peacekeeping and immigration. It also found that Canada has the capacity and obligation under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to assist developing countries to adapt to climate change. The chapter emphasized that little research had been undertaken to understand the policy and business implications of these impacts from a Canadian perspective.

Canada in a Changing Climate: Sector Perspectives on Impacts and Adaptation (Warren and Lemmen, 2014) included two chapters of relevance. The Adaptation chapter included a section on the international status of adaptation to provide a context by which to measure Canada’s own progress. Coverage focused on the status of adaptation in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. It concluded that adaptation implementation was in the early stages in most, if not all, developed countries, with rare instances of legislated mandates for adaptation. It also concluded that national adaptation strategies, although useful for signalling political commitment, did not always lead to action (Eyzaguirre and Warren, 2014). The Industry chapter assessed research on climate change adaptation and international trade (Kovacs and Thistlethwaite, 2014). It concluded that the topic remained an emerging field, highlighting evidence of exposure to climate change risk through disruptions to supply chains and distribution networks affecting Canadian trade markets and of opportunities to export financial risk-transfer tools to vulnerable regions. Canadian research was unavailable or not referenced.

Canadian and international interest in the future of Arctic navigation increased in the mid-2000s, driven by warming temperatures, the rapid retreat of sea ice and a commodity boom that raised expectations about the profitability of developing northern energy and mineral resources (Exner-Pirot, 2016; Guy and Lasserre, 2016; Harber, 2015; Farré et al., 2014). This section provides information on sea-ice reduction and navigation in the Canadian Arctic, then focuses on climate-related risks to Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage (NWP) and discusses the country’s capacity for effective stewardship of the NWP through safe, secure and sustainable shipping as climate change intensifies.

With the rapid retreat of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean (Derksen et al., 2019) and increased physical access to the region and its resources, the Arctic is now on the world stage. The rapid changes underway in the Arctic marine environment, including the declining extent, duration and thickness of sea ice and changes in the distribution and abundance of fish and other biological resources, fuel competing narratives for the future of the region. Economic narratives centre on the exploitation of, and competition over, natural resources (oil, gas and mineral resources, fish stocks), growth of the Arctic tourism industry and improved marine transportation (Ash, 2016; Arruda, 2015; Bader et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2011). Military security narratives focus on strengthened defence capabilities by northern circumpolar countries (e.g., Åtland, 2014) and potential threats from criminal elements (terrorists, smugglers, poachers) (Arctic Domain Awareness Center, 2017; Charron, 2015; Flake, 2014). Environmental narratives portray the Arctic as a maritime global commons with climate change implications for the entire planet (Bennett, 2015), and as a fragile and pristine area potentially threatened by resource or shipping disasters (Dodds and Hemmings, 2015). Finally, cultural and rights-based narratives portray Arctic lands, sea and ice as a homeland for Inuit peoples whose historic use and occupation have bolstered countries’ credibility to sovereignty claims (Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2017; Dodds and Hemmings, 2015; Arnold, 2012; Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2009). Common across all frames are global drivers of change in the region and the ripple effects of these drivers (see Figure 9.2). Climate change impacts, their links to new shipping lanes, and related disputes over Arctic waterways and territories are one slice of this complex cause-effect pathway.

Sea ice patterns shape navigability in Arctic waters, as do strong and variable winds, wave conditions and storminess (Ng et al., 2018; Pendakur, 2017). Since the late 1960s, rising air temperatures have contributed to declines in the extent, thickness and age of summer sea ice in the Arctic Ocean. The extent of sea ice in the summer has decreased by 5% to 20% per decade in the Canadian Arctic, including areas that span the NWP (see Box 9.1; Derksen et al., 2019). Ice in the Canadian Arctic that used to accumulate over multiple years without melting is giving way to thinner, seasonal ice, with the greatest drop in multi-year ice seen in the Beaufort Sea and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (Derksen et al., 2019). Under a range of future climate scenarios, scientists project continued reductions in seasonal sea ice, with the gradual opening of major waterways to ice-free conditions for part of the year (Derksen et al., 2019; Meredith et al., 2019; Ng et al., 2018). Increasing wave energy and heat released from wave mixing in the upper ocean can further accelerate sea ice reductions (Greenan et al., 2019). Predictions on the timing of ice-free conditions differ based on the definitions of “ice-free” and global greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration scenarios used. Relative to other sea routes in the Arctic Ocean, the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is likely to see continued sea ice further into the future, which will be transported southward into the NWP and pose an ongoing ice hazard for shipping (Derksen et al., 2019; Ng et al., 2018; Greenert, 2014). Analysis of wind, wave and storm conditions in the Arctic is limited by gaps in monitoring data and complex ice‒ocean‒atmosphere interactions (Ng et al., 2018). Studies indicate opposing trends for wind speed, but wave heights and wave-season duration in the Canadian Arctic are projected to increase over this century as sea ice declines (Greenan et al., 2019; Ng et al., 2018). Observations on sea ice changes by Inuit elders and experienced hunters in communities along the Canadian Arctic Archipelago support these scientific findings (Panikkar et al., 2018).

Vessel activity is increasing in Arctic waters and climate change and sea ice reductions are among the factors that have contributed to this rise (Guy and Lasserre, 2016; Pizzolato et al., 2016). The types of vessels operating in the region include bulk carriers and container ships for transit to southern markets; cruise ships, pleasure crafts, tankers, general cargo, and tug and barge as destination and resupply traffic; as well as government vessels and icebreakers (Dawson et al., 2018; Beveridge et al., 2016; Guy and Lasserre, 2016; Lasserre, 2016). Vessel traffic through Canadian Arctic waterways almost tripled between 1990 and 2015 (IPCC, 2019; Hildebrand et al., 2018, Guy and Lasserre, 2016; PEW Charitable Trusts, 2016; Charron, 2015). Distances travelled per vessel type have also increased (Dawson et al., 2018). Pizzolato et al. (2016) coupled spatial datasets on shipping activity and sea ice concentrations in the Canadian Arctic from 1990 to 2015, revealing a statistically significant correlation between these two variables in Beaufort Sea, Western Parry Channel, Western Baffin Bay and Foxe Basin. In other regions of the Canadian Arctic, sea ice conditions were not a predictor of trends in shipping activity (Pizzolato et al., 2016), with non-climatic factors—such as the ability to maintain predictable schedules—clearly influencing ship operators’ decisions (Beveridge et al., 2016; Lasserre et al., 2016). At present, transit traffic in the NWP remains too low to attract significant commercial or military attention (Charron, 2015; Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, 2014). Between 2000 and 2014 complete transits through the NWP ranged from six to 30 per year, with pleasure crafts accounting for the fastest growing transits (Beveridge et al., 2016; Guy and Lasserre, 2016; Government of Northwest Territories, 2015).

Although vessel traffic will almost certainly increase, affordable and safe Arctic shipping will be slow to develop, with the NWP unlikely to become the optimal route for international shipping (Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, 2014). Medium-term projections (2030s to 2050s) indicate annual numbers of vessel traffic through Arctic sea routes in the hundreds (e.g., Greenert, 2014); over 5% growth in annual shipping activity (Williams et al., 2011); expanded navigability for open water and moderately ice-strengthened vessels in September (Smith and Stephenson, 2013); and shifts in trade flows (Bekkers et al., 2018). However, the potential of Arctic routes as substitutes for conventional southern trade routes is likely overstated (Guy and Lasserre, 2016; Farré et al., 2014). Opportunities for expansion in Arctic shipping are tempered by continuing challenges to navigation and safety posed by mobile summer sea ice, drifting ice that clogs straits and channels, older, thicker ice and other climate elements (Dirksen et al., 2019; Ng et al., 2018; Pendakur, 2017; Farré et al., 2014). Uncertainties in global markets, commodity prices and technological innovation, among other non-climate factors, also limit shipping potential (Johnston et al., 2017; Andrew, 2014). These challenges translate into risks and costs to operators: more expensive ship construction related to ice strengthening; seasonal scheduling challenges; the need for equipment to spot and cope with ice and crews with unique experience; and high insurance premiums (Beveridge et al., 2016; Guy and Lasserre, 2016). The economic viability of Arctic shipping, compared with southern routes, is also hampered by technological and infrastructure deficiencies, including a lack of modern deep-water ports and other services offered to transiting ships, limited search and rescue capabilities, poor charting and mapping of Arctic waters, and continued difficulties with seasonal-ice predictions (Melia et al., 2017; Guy and Lasserre, 2016). Within the global Arctic, Canada and Russia have adopted different patterns in developing shipping lanes (see Table 9.2; Guy and Lasserre, 2016). As a result, international shipping through the NWP, with underdeveloped infrastructure and services, may be less preferable than shipping through the Northern Sea Route (Beveridge et al., 2016; Bonds, 2016; Bennett, 2014; Farré et al., 2014). For example, according to survey research, European shipping companies strongly view icebreaker escort and navigational aids as essential Arctic navigation services (Lasserre et al., 2016), which are attributes of the Northern Sea Route.

Although a substantial rise in vessel traffic volumes and international transits through the NWP is unlikely in the short term, preparing for long-term growth in navigation and maritime trade through the NWP and related environmental, social, economic, cultural and geopolitical risks is prudent (Dawson et al., 2020a; Hauser et al., 2018; Cotter, 2017). However, the NWP has been held up as a contested resource and a source of future international tension, particularly with increased Asian interest in the Arctic and its natural resources (Levitt, 2019; Exner-Pirot, 2016; Landriault, 2016; Rothwell, 2015; Wallin and Dallaire, 2011; Huebert, 2010). Climate change impacts, including shrinking sea ice, could weaken Canada’s sovereign claim to the NWP. Climate change also challenges the capacity of Canadian infrastructure and systems in place (e.g., search and rescue, offshore surveillance) to demonstrate effective stewardship of the NWP.

In legal terms, sovereignty refers to recognized rights of exclusive jurisdiction over a territory (Cox, 2015). Canada claims sovereignty over all waters of its Arctic Archipelago and regards the NWP as “internal” waters over which Canada has authority to regulate entry and control access to its various routes (see Video 9.1; Lalonde, 2019; Lackenbauer and Lalonde, 2017b). Historic occupation and use of Arctic lands, sea and ice by Indigenous Peoples, enclosure of the Arctic Archipelago within Canada’s baseline, and enforcement of environmental regulations in the NWP as part of the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) are key components of Canada’s sovereignty claims (Guy and Lasserre, 2016; Cox, 2015; Wright, 2014; Zellen, 2010; Carnaghan and Goody, 2006). As well, Canada has asserted military control in the North through human resource and infrastructure expenditures. This includes the expansion of the Canadian Rangers, a fleet of patrol vessels, a Canadian Forces training centre, a deep-water fuelling facility, and increased radar and satellite capacity. Maintaining the NWP as internal waters is also a priority for the Canadian Inuit, as the passage is part of their Arctic homeland, Inuit Nunangat (see Video 9.2; George, 2019a; Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2018). Pollution, oil spills and negative impacts on marine mammals are among the Inuit’s main concerns related to increased shipping activity (Dawson et al., 2020a; Arctic Council, 2009).

Video 9.1: Sovereignty: Political science and security scholars’ perspective on Arctic sovereignty and shipping in the Northwest Passage. Source: Baldassari, 2017, 2013.

Video 9.2: Nilliajut 2: Inuit perspectives on the Northwest Passage, shipping and marine use. Source: Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2018.

Perceived threats to Canada’s sovereign claim over the NWP arise from countries’ differing opinions on the status of the NWP as internal Canadian waters (Lackenbauer and Lalonde, 2017b). Of the five states with Arctic coasts—Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States—the United States has long viewed the NWP as an international strait where foreign ships and aircraft can freely transit the waters and airspace (Lalonde, 2019; U.S. Government, 2013). Non-Arctic nations have weighed in on the NWP controversy. Of note, Germany, a country with observer status at the Arctic Council, has campaigned for freedom of navigation in the Arctic Ocean (including the NWP) (Federal Foreign Office of Germany, 2013). In its 2018 Arctic Policy, China, another Arctic Council observer, invoked the importance of freedom of navigation and the right to use Arctic shipping routes (People’s Republic of China, 2018). Despite alarmist concerns (Exner-Pirot, 2016), Canada’s claims to the NWP have been largely unchallenged. To date, all maritime disagreements have been well managed by established international mechanisms, providing a foundation for future cooperation among Arctic states and beyond. Canada’s claims and regulations in the Arctic are typically complied with, and there are no current threats to sovereignty (Charron and Fergusson, 2018).

Competing views exist on whether climate change weakens Canada’s position on claims to the NWP (Burke, 2017; Rothwell, 2015). Critical uncertainties relate to the extent of international traffic in the NWP and the interpretation of Article 234 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which grants coastal states the right to enact laws and regulations to control marine pollution from vessels in “ice-covered” waters within its Exclusive Economic Zone (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982). For the NWP to be considered an international strait, it would have to meet geographic and functional requirements: it must connect two bodies of the high seas (as it does) and must be considered “useful” as determined by a sufficient number of transits (Carnaghan and Goody, 2006). Legal precedents suggest that the small number of current transits and those expected in the medium term would not qualify the NWP as a useful route for international maritime traffic. However, if accelerated sea ice melting enabled a substantial rise in commercial shipping, perceptions of the NWP as an international strait would intensify (Lackenbauer and Lalonde, 2017a; Cox, 2015; Huebert, 2001). The power conferred by UNCLOS Article 234 to regulate shipping in the interest of environmental protection of ice-covered areas has served to expand Canada’s jurisdiction in Arctic waters (Burke, 2017; Farré et al., 2014). As sea ice retreats and navigation becomes less hazardous, Canada’s ability to count on Article 234 for international legitimacy could diminish (Rothwell, 2015; Farré et al., 2014). Russia, which also invokes Article 234 to regulate shipping activity in its Exclusive Economic Zone along the Northern Sea Route, could also face challenges to its claims as sea ice cover diminishes (Flake, 2014).

Regardless of legal stances over sovereignty in the NWP and the right to control activities of other nations, Canada can proactively exercise stewardship of the NWP (Cox, 2015) by focusing on safe, secure and sustainable development of shipping routes (Dawson et al., 2020a; Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, 2014). At present, Canada is poorly equipped to enforce environmental protections in Canada’s Arctic waterways (Giguère et al., 2017; Cox, 2015; McRae, 2007; Huebert, 2003). Canada remains deficient in infrastructure (e.g., charting; navigational, weather and communication support services; ports, harbours and terminals; ship repair and waste management for vessels) and emergency response capabilities, including for oil spills. Adequate infrastructure and the ability to respond to emergencies are critical for protecting the fragile Arctic environment (Hildebrand et al., 2018; Lajeunesse, 2018; Giguère et al., 2017; Arctic Council, 2009). Maintaining maritime domain awareness, and monitoring and serving such an expansive, remote and rugged region, will remain financially and logistically challenging (Guy and Lasserre, 2016; Dawson et al., 2014). Aside from pursuing coordination with Arctic littoral states, a practical focus on the needs of international operators serving resupply and destination traffic is one way to manage risk posed by international ships (Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, 2014; Charron, 2005). This strategy also commands respect for Canadian sovereignty over the NWP, just as Russia’s approach to providing pilotage and icebreaking services and mandating their use, as well as its investments in maritime infrastructure and search and rescue capabilities, support its claim to Northern Sea Route waters (Cotter, 2017).

Managing indirect impacts of climate change, such as increased international vessel traffic in the NWP, competition over new shipping lanes and affronts to Canada’s sovereignty, is less about reducing specific climate threats and more about enhancing capabilities to meet valued outcomes even as the climate changes (Meredith et al., 2019; Stockholm Environmental Institute, 2013). Public opinion in Canada on how to assert Arctic sovereignty has shifted over the years, from a marked preference for military capabilities and surveillance in 2000–2005 to a mix that also includes diplomacy, attention to the needs of northern and Indigenous communities, science and environmental protection in 2011–2014 (Landriault, 2016). The following discussion on capabilities to build Canada’s capacity to develop safe, secure and sustainably managed Arctic waterways in a rapidly changing environment draws on three frameworks: the Arctic Resilience Action Framework (Arctic Council, 2017); a framework to foster strategic capabilities for climate security (Werrell and Femia, 2019); and the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2009). The multi-faceted strategies to build adaptive capacity comprise diplomatic, informational, military and socioeconomic themes, and the protection of the rights of Indigenous people is an element of each.

Diplomatic capabilities include international cooperation and actively strengthening international standards governing the Arctic. Arctic governance comprises a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral agreements, stemming from the Arctic Council and International Maritime Organization, and anchored in UNCLOS (Arruda, 2015; Borgerson, 2013). Existing instruments have been effective in driving consistent and cooperative action to date (House of Commons, 2019; Plouffe, 2011; Byers, 2010; Government of Canada, 2010; Byers and Lalonde, 2009), but need to reflect changing conditions—climatic and otherwise (Byers, 2010). For example, the mandatory International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (“Polar Code”) adopted in 2017 clarifies shipping and navigation standards related to commercial vessels, operational concerns, search and rescue in polar waters, and environmental protection. Monitoring and forecasting of ice conditions will be critical to the Code’s effective application (Guy and Lasserre, 2016). The rise in Arctic shipping has led to a higher rate of reported accidents per kilometre travelled compared to southern waterways (Council of Canadian Academies, 2016), noise and air pollution (Marelle et al., 2018; Halliday et al., 2017), as well as disruptions to wildlife and cultural activities of community residents (Olsen et al., 2019; Panikkar et al., 2018). These trends lend urgency to resolving practical issues among littoral states and, in partnership with Inuit, on management and funding of navigation services such as traffic control, navigation aids, environmental protection and clean-up procedures (Charron, 2005). Climate change adaptation of the rapidly evolving cruise shipping industry is one area of active research (see Case Story 9.1), as the cruise ship sector is in need of improved governance (Pashkevich et al., 2015).

Informational capabilities refer to collection and dissemination of information on climate change risk and responses. Climate change is one among many pressures that shape Arctic shipping and its effects on people and ecosystems. Therefore, governments and others are turning to holistic approaches that incorporate spatial, analytical and modelling methods to understand past and potential damages and opportunities brought by marine vessel activity (Pickard et al., 2019). The Arctic Corridors group, in partnership with Northern Voices, has studied and written many reports about climate change and the cumulative effects of marine shipping (Carter et al., 2019). A number of data resources and tools exist to facilitate the integration of direct climate change impacts (e.g., changing sea-ice patterns, precipitation events, strong and variable winds, changing sea levels and wave patterns, permafrost degradation and enhanced coastal erosion) into plans and decisions related to marine navigation and to assess the strength of management strategies (Debortoli et al., 2019; Pendakur, 2017). For example, efforts to determine safe navigation routes are building on data collected to measure the depths of Arctic water as part of Canada’s submission to UNCLOS on its extended continental shelf (Global Affairs Canada, 2019b). Consistent with its mandate to maintain coastal infrastructure and safe secure waterways, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans developed a web-based planning tool to generate estimates of climate variability and change in the Beaufort Sea, Davis Strait and the Mackenzie Delta region (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2018). However, trends and projections of socioeconomic variables, including the indirect impacts of climate change, are less widely studied. Understanding and evaluating future climate-related risks of international vessel traffic in the NWP can be challenging because of the uncertainties involved. Foresight tools, such as scenario building and horizon scanning, can help identify management actions that are robust to a range of futures (Fetzek et al., 2017). Used in national security planning (e.g., Pezard et al., 2018) foresight tools also aid in climate change adaptation planning and in strengthening emergency response. Of equal importance to the creation of climate risk information are institutions charged with translating insights for decision makers to take action (Arctic Council, 2017; Fetzek et al., 2017).

Military capabilities correspond to those possessed by the armed forces and national defence agencies. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has recognized climate change as a threat multiplier, Canada is aware of the potential security threats of climate change. Canada’s Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy commits to increasing enforcement capacity, situational awareness and monitoring of Arctic waters, referring to climate change as one of the drivers behind the need for these enhanced capabilities (Government of Canada, 2017b). A companion Defence Energy and Environment Strategy guides “greening” efforts by Canadian defence (Minister of National Defence, 2017). Both the defence policy and greening strategy outline investments and concrete actions to reduce the carbon footprint of defence installations and operations, but are far less specific on investments and actions required to adapt to climate change. Canada’s military is already stretched to respond to climate-related emergencies at home and overseas, with climate change expected to increase the demand for military assistance (Major and Shivji, 2019). The integrity of military assets and facilities could be at risk from climate change. While the United States has identified its military assets and operations most vulnerable to climate change, as a basis for setting priorities (Center for Climate and Security, 2020), Canada has not. Symposia on climate change and security, such as those held by the Canadian Forces College in 2018 and 2020 (Canadian Forces College, 2021), can help raise the profile of these gaps to senior decision makers.

Capabilities in the realm of socioeconomic development centre on capital and infrastructure investments and public policies and regulations applicable to Arctic waters that incorporate climate risk. Climate change adaptation solutions for vessels and navigation in the Arctic and for maritime infrastructure are increasingly documented and include winter-operation risk assessments, ship-specific winterization (including for mixed-ice environments), and relocation of shore-based resupply infrastructure (Meredith et al., 2019; Pendakur, 2017). They apply to both private- and public-sector operators. At a strategic and policy level, the Arctic Northern Policy Framework, the Oceans Protection Plan’s Cumulative Effects of Marine Shipping initiative, the Northern Marine Transportation Corridors (now known as “Low Impact Corridors”) and Strategic Environmental Impact Assessments linked to Arctic resource development (e.g., Nunavut Impact Review Board, 2019) are initiatives that could support the safe and sustainable development of shipping in the NWP (Porta et al., 2017; PEW Charitable Trusts, 2016). The Low Impact Corridors initiative in particular is a promising response to increased Arctic shipping activity (Dawson et al., 2020a), as it proposes to install the necessary services (e.g., emergency response, navigational support) and infrastructure to ensure safer navigation while considering ecological and cultural significance (Levitt, 2019). Inuit communities acknowledge the potential benefits of shipping, but urge inclusive and collaborative research to determine corridor routes with minimal negative impacts on traditional activities and sensitive ecosystems (Dawson et al., 2020a).

Most of the agreements governing shared marine and fresh waters that cross the Canada–U.S. border were negotiated and signed before climate change was a recognized concern. These arrangements face new challenges since they assume “stationarity.”